I suppose it would be possible to discover a brief moment in time when everyone was using language correctly. Could it also be the case that we might discover a time when everyone was using language incorrectly? In physics the rule is that if it is not prohibited it is compulsory. The probability of the former event happening would be very slight indeed but I suspect the latter event would not be as fanciful. In any case how could we possibly know? Language is not immutable. It has changed considerably since it first evolved and it is still changing. Nevertheless we all are destined to use language incorrectly at one time or another but what means are at our disposal to allow us to discover our misuse? Must we merely wait to be corrected by someone whose opinion we respect or until the mass of opinion concurs with our usage?
The mass of opinion is not a very reliable barometer for correct language use. Nonsensical statements are commonplace within the general public, among politicians, from shady salespersons and from the semi-literate. Even philosophers have from time to time demonstrated they have concocted a questionable proposition. For example in attempting to explain the distinction between expression and expressing John Dewey opined “An onlooker may say ‘What a magnificent expression of rage!’ But the enraged being is only raging, quite a different matter from expressing rage.”[i]
Dewey is correct to chide his onlooker but he has jerry-rigged his argument. The onlooker’s statement deserves censor because it is grammatically incorrect. Magnificent is an adjective describing the noun ‘expression’. To make his argument Dewey has created an onlooker that doesn’t speak with sentences for there is no verb in the statement. Dewey was attempting to unpack the notion of ‘expressing’ to show that it is a controlled, organized activity and not merely an impulsive purging activity but his pursuit was misdirected.
Dewey has fallen victim to a mental slip of the tongue. To make his remark coherent his onlooker would have to say ‘What a magnificently expressed rage.’ If this were the case then it would have been clear to Dewey that the point in contention was merely a value judgment determining the quality of the rage and not an explanation of how to use objective criteria to establish the concept of ‘expressing’.
No doubt we are all capable of making such a mistake. I draw your attention to Dewey’s remark because our understanding of rage is important to our understanding of the distinction between emotions and feelings.
The question that must be asked is how did we come by the emotions we express? Were they learnt or are they merely involuntary responses emanating from within us? If you hold the latter view you are in good company for such a view holds that emotions and feelings are directly connected; so much so that the two terms can be used synonymously. Indeed some hold that it is a seeming self evident truth that emotions are feelings. But it is neither self evident nor is it the truth.
I think few would deny that emotions have meaning. The person who angrily exclaims ‘Come over here!’ is making a different statement from the person who merely states ‘Come over here.’ In the former statement anger is part of the propositional symbol (sentence) and is understood as a command rather than a request. There are two points to demonstrate here; emotions are expressional rather than expressive and emotions are learnt as our language is learnt.
Anger, along with fear, are two of those pet emotions psychologists use to demonstrate the so called affect component of emotions and tend to distinguish them from what is termed higher level emotions such as remorse. There is little agreement among psychologists about how the cause of emotions should be correctly described[ii] though most tend to presume that to investigate the psychological and/or physiological cause of particular feelings is to investigate emotions.
Steven Pinker reports that Catherine Lutz’s research of the Ifaluk ( a Micronesian People) demonstrates that they do not experience anger. Rather they demonstrate their offense with what they call Song; a show of resentment indicating a moral infraction. He points out that “If emotion is defined by behavior then emotions certainly do differ across cultures.”[ia]
Given this state of affairs I have no compunction in insisting emotions are components of language and have the same relationship to our spoken language as punctuation marks have to our written language; they serve the communication of ideas by showing emphasis.
To understand the distinction between expressive and expressional behavior we need to investigate the notion of feelings. The term ‘feeling’ is a pernicious one for we use it in so many different ways our understanding is easily confused. I have already mentioned the belief that feeling can be used as a synonym for emotion but there are also times when the term is used to mark thinking activity as when a person says ‘I have a feeling I should vote for x party.’ We also use the term to express desires or urges as when we say ‘I’m feeling like a good long walk.’ We use the term to convey information about our physical state as in ‘I’m feeling dizzy’ or ‘I’m feeling tired.’ We are also in the habit of using feeling to refer to such things as the feeling of conviction. “One speaks of a feeling of conviction because there is a tone of conviction.”[iii] Wittgenstein is pointing out that tones are as much part of our propositional symbols (sentences) as gestures.
Commonly, however, feelings are understood as sensations within the body. When we have a feeling of pain we can be said to have a sensation of pain; indeed, sensation is a less misleading term. Sensations are such things as pains, aches, twinges, tics, throbs, palpitations, flushes, blushes, etc. These sensations are said to be expressed by the body much as a bruise is expressed on our leg. But the darkish red spot on our leg is a symptom of our bruise and not a symbol of it. Symptoms have significance but they have no meaning. Symptoms are expressive but they are not expressional. They are signs that require interpretation (the darkish red spot may be a carcinoma) whereas if we understand the system in which a symbol works we grasp it immediately.
Sensations are also symptoms and to hold that emotions are feelings is to hold that emotions are the physical manifestations of symptoms involuntarily expressed by the body that must be interpreted before we can understand them. But few are in doubt when we present others with an expression of anger, love, remorse, etc.
“Thus sorrow often goes with weeping, and characteristic sensations with the latter. (The voice heavy with tears). But these sensations are not the emotions.”[iv] Wittgenstein’s point is clear. Some of us may become red in the face and feel a flush of heat when we offer the expression others recognize as anger but the red face and flush of heat is not the anger. It was this point that confused Bertrand Russell.
“On one occasion my dentist injected a considerable amount of this substance into my blood, in the course of administering a local anesthetic. I turned pale and trembled, and my heart beat violently; the bodily symptoms of fear were present, as the books said they should be, but it was quite obvious to me that I was not actually feeling fear.”[v] Though Russell’s use of the term feeling in this context is queer it is clear he concluded there were no grounds to be afraid; to present the expression we could recognize as fear. Such symptoms might also occur in a teenager who falls in love with a rock star at a concert or in the boyfriend who displays anger as a result of the girl’s behavior. What should be clear is that there is no particular sensation (feeling) that is a necessary condition of any particular emotion expression. We did not learn to express emotions by investigating sensations within our bodies. As children we learnt to express emotions as we learnt language from our parents, our teachers and our peers. Indeed, it is a measure of our ability to use language that provides us with the means to express any one emotion in so many different ways. It is not unusual to discover that a child’s tantrums diminish as he or she becomes more proficient with language.
One of the reasons we find television soap operas so banal is that the scripts are written for the least literate or language lazy among us. The emotions that are expressed are commonplace, lacking subtlety, richness and variety. Persons who have a poverty of language have a poverty of emotions but they, no doubt, are capable of experiencing all the sensations we experience. While Shakespeare also wrote for groundlings who could neither read nor write, New English was still a blossoming experience for his audience. His language use was varied, rich and at times subtle and often nuanced providing a bountiful resource for the expression of emotion and his audience delighted in the flavor of it.
“One’s hand writes: it does not write because one wills, but one wills what it writes.”[vi] Wittgenstein’s point is well taken. Writing is a voluntary behavior perceived through what we write. So too is expressing an emotion voluntary behavior perceived by the expression of it. It is not the case that we are born with a collection of emotions that we must learn to harness. We willfully express anger, love, etc. While some may wish to renege on their responsibility for their voluntary, unbecoming expressions and attribute the cause to others, they have no defense.
Some along with Gilbert Ryle[vii] hold that emotions are propensities or dispositions to act in certain ways. Ryle’s theory is that our emotional states are discovered by us much as we discover another’s emotional state. But emotions are not dispositions or agitations as Ryle holds. Agreeableness and aggressiveness are dispositions and are conditions of behavior. We may aggressively offer an expression of love or we may be angry in an agreeable manner. Dispositions are a condition of non-emotion behavior as well as emotion behavior. ‘Disposition’ is a collective noun and while it may be part of a person’s disposition to be easily angered, the anger is not the disposition. A person’s disposition is tied to the circumstances of an expression and not the expression itself.
Implicit in Ryle’s remarks is the notion that emotions are components of communication that are distinct from what is communicated. I think it is clear that we can no more separate tones of voice, pitch, facial and body gestures, and grimaces from the meaning of a statement than we can separate meaning from the propositional symbol (sentence) that is the expression of it. It is no small consideration to point out that we are often asked ‘Do you mean it?’ when our tones of voice, pitch, interjections, gestures and grimaces do not correlate with our statements or the circumstances in which they are made.
Though Ryle seems to concur that emotions are learnt he mistakenly holds that emotions can be shammed but emotions can be no more shammed than the meaning of a sentence can be shammed. They can be false in the sense that they do not apply or they can be poorly or inadvertently expressed by inarticulate language users but emotions are not such things that are counterfeited; physical behavior can be as awkward or inarticulate as speech. When we describe an emotion as insincere we are making a statement about its applicability not its substance. Indeed, it is the substance of an emotion that allows us to recognize it in the first place.
Learning to control our emotions does not mean that they are such things that we need to harness or overcome by force of will. This implies they are contained within us and need to be trained. Rather, learning to control emotions is the learning of new and different emotions in place of those we abuse or are limited by. Particular expressions of emotion can become habitual much as the uses of particular phrases or words become habitual.
I began this essay with a query concerning our use of language. In part, my purpose was to alert the reader to the difficulties public usage confronts us with when attempting to discover correct or incorrect language use. When faced with such difficulties Wittgenstein urges us to defer to public criteria when attempting to unpack our language problems. Though many writers demonstrate they misunderstand the term, public criteria are significantly different from public usage. The term public criteria merely means that there are criteria that are open to discovery by anyone who cares to look. It is in this sense that they are public.
To understand how the use of public criteria works in practice we should look again at Dewey’s remark. However confusing his point may be it is clear that Dewey considers rage an emotion but what is rage?
Certain persons who are subject to bouts of depression understand that rage is an uncomfortable sensation, often described as being in the chest area of the body and caused by a neurochemical condition that has direct physiological and behavioral effects. Persons subject to rage and unaware that its cause is neurochemical often respond negatively. Some suffers conclude that they are angry and express anger toward those who are innocent of transgression. Their expression of anger is often an attempt to free themselves of their rage but it is seldom successful for rage is a symptom and anger is an emotion. It is not unusual that a person expressing anger in a violent fashion – throwing things, smashing furniture and being loud and vocal – is described as enraged or raging. In such cases the term rage is most often used as a metaphor likening the display of external turbulence to the neurochemically caused internal turbulence that some are known to suffer. Of course it may be the case that such a person is also suffering from an intense sensation of rage caused by a neurochemical imbalance but more often such violent behavior is an attempt to intimidate and/or an expression of frustration; a tantrum.
We generally display anger when we believe our rights or the rights of others have been transgressed but in such cases the expression of anger is the result of conclusions we draw and not the result of a sensation we feel. Also, it is not unusual to find ourselves confronted with a person behaving in a controlled unresponsive manner as if deliberately trying not to present an expression of anger but this, of course, is merely another expression of the emotion and is recognized as easily as a blatant expression. In many instances it is merely a strategy designed to intimidate; a tactic known to actors as ‘playing under’ a highly charged situation.
A similar but more overt problem tripped up Russell when discussing fear. The chemicals injected into him produced anxiety, not the bodily symptoms of fear.
“It is one thing to feel acute fear, and another to have a ‘chronic’ fear of someone. But fear is not a sensation.”[viii] Wittgenstein (or his translator) is puzzling with his use of the term feel but he is clear about his description of fear. Russell was feeling anxiety; a sensation we all are familiar with. Some psychologist take it as a given that anxiety is the feeling of fear but we can express fear when we are not subject to anxiety and we may well have reason to express anger, love, remorse, joy, etc. when anxiety is present. Indeed, Russell expressed wonder! It is well known by medical practitioners that rages and anxieties are neurochemical conditions and are the common bedfellows of many long term cannabis and cocaine users.
We can question all of our emotions in much the same way. “Love is not a feeling. Love is put to the test, pain not. One does not say: “That was not true pain, or it would not have gone off so quickly.”[ix] Here Wittgenstein shows us that there are public criteria that demonstrate expressions of love whereas sensations are incorrigible. If you say you have a pain we are obliged to accept it even though you may not display what has come to be known as pain behavior (assuming there are no grounds to suspect deception). Also: “If someone acts grief in the study, he will indeed readily become aware of the tensions in his face. But be really sad, or follow a sorrowful action in a film, and ask yourself if you were aware of your face.”[x] There are two aspects to this direction. First, it is clear that we can display the emotion of grief or sadness at will, alone in our study (usually we have to imagine a situation to enlist the expression) and second if we are accomplished we need not consciously attend to our expressions of emotion as they are expressed anymore than we need to consciously attend to syntax when we speak. It is, perhaps, this aspect that deceives many into thinking emotions are impulsive expressions welling up from within us but we seldom assess ourselves to see if we are acting in a loving fashion when we spontaneously carry out a caring act of love though we may, as a result of our expression, find it a pleasurable experience.
As we can think and have a dialogue with ourselves we can express emotions when we are alone. We can contemplate caring acts of love for or from someone and find it pleasurable. But the pleasure we gain (often described as the feeling of being in love) is the result of our thoughts, not the cause of them. By the same token a caring act of love can be very unpleasant as when we provide the opportunity for a loved one to die in order to cease their suffering.
While writing this I rose to go to the kitchen only to be met half way by my wife who handed me a stack of newspapers to set outside in the recycle bin. I grinned and exclaimed with joy “For me?” My reaction was spontaneous, honest and sincere and my wife responded with a complementary gesture but I had no need to search myself for a sensation that would confirm joy was the expression I should offer though both my wife and I received pleasure from the exchange. Ryle would say I was shamming joy but I was sincere and my wife accepted it for what it was.
Throughout this essay I have relied on Wittgenstein to make
what I suspect will be an unpopular argument. It has serious
implications for the notion of expression in art. Nevertheless I
persist, well aware that courage is the price paid for such
thoughts[xi]. Launt Thompson
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[i] Dewey, John, Art as Experience, Putnam ,1958 pp61.
[ia Pinker, Steven, The Blank Slate, Penguin Books 2003 Digital edition. [ii] See . Griffiths Paul E, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. University of Chicago Press. 1997 Also: Lacewing, Michael Emotion and Cognition: Recent Developments and Therapeutic Practice, in Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, June 2004; 11,2 pp 175 – 186 And: Lazarus, Richard S. Cognition and Motivation in Emotion, American Psychologist, April 1991 Vol. 46, No. 4, pp 352-367
[iii] Wittgenstein, L., Zettel, Blackwell, , 2nd edition Trans. G.E..M . Anscombe, Oxford, 1967, #513 [v] Russell, Bertrand, An Outline of Philosophy, Unwin Books, London, 1970 pp 226. [vi]Wittgenstein, L., Zettel, 2nd edition Trans. G.E..M . Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967 #586 [vii] Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, Penguin University Books,1973 [xi] Wittgenstein, L. Culture and Value, Trans. by Peter Winch, Blackwell, Oxford,1980,,52e
