Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.
L. Wittgenstein
Prologue
In 2008 the community of Linguistic scientists, Evolutionary Psychologists, and Biologists, concerned with trying to propose a theory of how language originated, were confronted with the publication of a small book that effectively trashed all their cherished publicized theories. The title of the book is Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes, (Pantheon Books, 2008) and is the story of anthropological linguist Daniel Everett’s twenty seven year sojourn with the Pirahã (pee-da-HAN) in the state of Amazonas, Brazil. The noted philosopher John Searle said of the work: “Everett has written an excellent book. A powerful autobiographical account…a brilliant piece of ethnographical description of life among the Pirahã and…if he is right he will permanently change our conception of human language.”
I submit this prologue as a way of informing the general reader that how language is to be described is very much in dispute among prominent language researchers. Philosophers, however, are rarely at odds with the role and place of language in our lives. Those who describe themselves as ‘ordinary language’ philosophers are concerned with how we say what we say about the world and use as their motto the axiom quoted at the beginning of this essay. We ignore it at our linguistic peril.
By way of example consider this comment by W. Tecumseh Fitch, Professor of Cognitive Biology at the University of Vienna. While criticizing the theories of W.V.O. Quine (Word and Object, MIT Press, 1960) Fitch argues: ***
“The child doesn’t induce such wacky concepts, for the same reason a dog does not conceptualize a rabbit in these ways, but rather as a medium sized fleet-footed potential prey item.” (The Evolution of Language, Cambridge University Press. pp.127)In the first instance, Fitch believes animals hold concepts (I will discuss this later) and he gives us an idea of the type of concept that a dog holds about a rabbit. In philosophy circles this would be described as a howler. There is no way that a dog is going to think to itself, ‘Hmm, there goes a fleet-footed potential prey item.’ What Fitch wants to say about how a dog conceptualizes, he can’t say in any intelligible way.
***
“The difficulty here in giving an account of what’s going is that if someone makes false assumptions about the way language works and tries to give an account of something with language conceived as functioning in this way, the result is not something false but nonsense.” (L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, Blackwell, Oxford, #22.)
To be fair, Fitch qualifies, somewhat, his understanding of the concepts animals are said to have: “Animals possess concepts but do not express them as signals.”(Fitch, pp148) I would venture a guess that they do not express them at all. When we discover what it is that Fitch wishes to describe as the type of concepts animals have we are no more informed.
***
“If by “concepts” we simply mean “mental representations, not necessarily conscious,” few scientists today question the notion that animals have concepts, at some level, and contemporary cognitive ethologists and comparative psychologists are providing an ever more impressive catalog of the types of concepts that non- linguistic creatures possess and manipulate.” (172)
Here it is, a concept held by an animal in Fitch’s terms is a mental representation, not necessarily conscious. Fitch does not explain what he means by ‘mental representation’ and I suspect he would like us to translate it to mean ‘mental image’ without taking responsibility for such a translation else he would have used the term. So what is a mental representation that is not necessarily conscious? And how does he know? Is this concept held by an animal merely neurons flashing away around an animal’s brain? Is it because the animal solves some task that is not an instinctive solution? Surely such an act would not demonstrate any more than the animal solves a task. It is clear to me that Fitch is trying to twist language to support his theory. But of course I have a bias and Fitch is determined to not let it go unnoticed:
***
“The widespread notion that concepts and thought require language is indefensible: it either conceals a definition of thought that is based on human language (and is therefore tautological), or implicitly singles out and privileges very small subset of human processes that are not shared with other animals as “thought”.” (172)
Mea culpa and I am sure there is no concealment here but let’s deal with the notion of a concept first. Previously I pointed out a long held view: “The term [concept] is the modern replacement for the older term idea, stripped of the latter’s imagist associations and thought of as more intimately bound up with language.” (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy) A concept is how we confirm to ourselves and show others that we can use a term correctly. As Fitch well knows part of his concept of a rabbit is ‘a medium sized fleet-footed potential prey’ for dogs. We don’t question his concept of a rabbit for what he gives us is correct as far as it goes. And because he is so articulate we assume he could provide a further description should we ask for it. Fitch wants to have one use of the term ‘concept’ for humans and a different use of the term concept for animals while at the same time extracting and profiteering the weight of the term as it is used for humans. If it is true that animal concepts are so different from human concepts why doesn’t Fitch use a different term to describe what is taking place? ***
“You learned the concept ‘pain’ when you learned language.” ( L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell, #384)
Now let’s deal with the notion of a ‘thought’. I contend that it is not tautological. In the first instance a thought is what emerges from or during the process of thinking. As I mentioned in Part I of this essay, thinking is concerned with such things a reasoning, believing, reflecting, calculating, deliberating, joking, analyzing, fantasizing, pondering, etc. Surely we can expect that these activities can only take place by using language? What do others believe to be the case?
***
“All intelligible thought involves the use of symbols, and most frequently the use of words.” (Paul Hirst, Knowledge and the Curriculum (RKP 1974)
***
“Whether or not what we see is objectively there, whether or not there is any objective reality to see, what we say or think discursively about it must be said or thought in language.” (Hanna Fenchel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice University of California Press, 1972)
Pointedly, Pitkin only discusses discursive thinking for the other mode of thinking is intuitive. Most often when we think intuitively we arrive at the right answer but we don’t know how we got it. I doubt if anyone would suggest that animals think intuitively though we know they act on instinct.
***
“When I think in language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought.” ( L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Basil Blackwell, #329)
Again, do animals think? Why should we hold that animals need to think? Why do we feel the need to cloak animals in our cognitive clothes?
The sentence you are now reading is what is known as a propositional symbol. Indeed all languages are made up of such symbols; language is a system of symbols used in regular modes of combination in accordance with established rules (conventions). All symbols work within a system. Perhaps because they are so closely related, many people confuse symbols with signs. For example, take the word ‘confuse’ from the previous sentence. It is merely an impression on the virtual paper of my computer; it is a sign. It has no meaning until it is used (meaning is use) in a sentence that makes sense. We often think of isolated words as having meaning but this is a mistake. We look up a word in the dictionary and we discover how it has been used previously. We may discover several different uses. This is what we call a definition; meanings others have used before us. Definitions are not sacrosanct. As metaphor is one of the most common aspects of our language we often find new uses, and consequently, new meanings for our words. We can say, for example: ‘The spices he has used confuse the taste of the tainted meat.’ We have created a new use and a new symbol.
I have tried to unpack the idea of symbols in language because many researchers misunderstand the role symbols play and we read such things as this comment:
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“Symbols are things that stand for other things, much more (and less) than the signs of religion or political ideologies.” (Ian Davidson, Archaeological Evidence of Language Origins: States of Art in, Language Evolution, Oxford University Press 2003)
I have mentioned that a symbol is a sign under the particular conditions that give it meaning. Wittgenstein takes this further.
***
“Explanation adds to the symbol, gives us more to get hold of. The symbol is in some sense self-contained; you grasp it as a whole. It does not point to something outside itself; it does not anticipate something else in a shadowy way.” (Wittgenstein’s Lectures Cambridge, 1930-1932, Blackwell, 1980, pg.43)
What other thing could a symbol mean but itself?
Launt Thompson
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